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Chapter Seven. Deep Dark Secrets Of The SOES Bandit |
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I Am the Man Who Rocked Wall Street |
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The SEC Consent Decree Against the NASD |
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Regulatory Accommodation |
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Nasdaq Is Flawed in Concept |
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SRO Responsibilities |
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Membership Organization |
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Nasdaq Market Operations |
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Class Action Update |
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Nasdaq Price Rigging Appears to Continue |
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Payment for Order Flow |
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What the New Order Handling Rules Mean to You |
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The Industry's Trading "Conventions" |
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The Fight for Positive Change Begins |
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The Crash of 1987 |
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A Brief History of DAET Time |
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SOES Bandits |
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N*PROVE |
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"SOES Ahead!" |
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The Changing Slant of the Media |
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A Second Look at the Cost of Courtesy |
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The Power of the Order Clerk |
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The Obvious Error Rule |
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The Market Makers Wanted to End SOES and DAET |
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My Comments on the NASD Litigation |
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NYSE Management Principles |
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Chapter Eight. What Your Broker Doesn't Want You To Know: Or Bearing The Bull |
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Regulators Are Potentially Part of the Problem |
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The NASD's Regulatory Deficiencies |
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Backing Away |
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Excused Withdrawal |
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NASD Harrassment |
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Professional Trading Accounts |
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Selective Refusal to Trade |
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The Pricing Convention |
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The Role of INSTINET |
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The Chinese Market |
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Bear Stearns Meeting and Subsequent Narrowings |
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