|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Zen inquiry asks us to penetrate who we are behind our actions and behind our usual pretensions and identifications. More self-inquiry: "Who is it who is so frightened at losing his capital?" "Who is it getting so excited when Redback climbs 30 points in 40 minutes?" "Who is it who is feeling greedy after holding for so long, wanting just a little bit higher price for Dell before selling?'' |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Zen suggests that we stay flexible in our self-concept of who we think we are. In the same way we have said we need to be able to shift our mental gears quickly when a stock story changes, a sector changes, or the psychology of the market as a whole changes, we need to stay fluid in how we go about constructing our identities. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We should not allow ourselves to get too locked in to any one approach to investing, any one method, tool, opinion, or behavior. While a disciplined approach is useful to keep us on track, Zen would suggest we learn when to drop the discipline and accept what is new in this moment, what is right in front of us and calling for a response. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rigid personality types can't handle Zen spontaneity. It threatens their compulsive routines. And yet, Zen monks are as orderly, precise, and predictable in their daily routines as the most neurotic, compulsively disciplined people you could find! But the distinction is, they do it from a radically different mental state. They are not performing their rituals out of anxiety, as the compulsive is. They are very present with each precise movementnot at all leaning into the future. And because they are so present-centered, they are free to respond with spontaneity to the demands of the moment. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
An example of overly rigid discipline would be not having the flexibility to flow with the market when many technology stocks took off for an unprecedented ride toward the end of 1999. If we are too stuck in one approach, say value investing, or too caught in our doubting of what we see happening, we would not be able to shift gears and adapt to the market just as we find it. As we said in Chapter 10, the window to adjust to the violent changes seems to be getting smaller, as violent ups and downs are compressed into shorter periods of time. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some continued to argue against having positions in telecommunications or Internet business-to-business stocks on fundamental or technical grounds. They worried about parabolic upward curves that they believed would collapse on themselves and interest rates that were three months into the futureall the while missing out on what the market was telling them. |
|
|
|
|
|